fix: 2026-06-09 full-codebase audit hardening
Validation: shared NaN-guarded Zod coercion helpers in schemas/common.ts replace the raw number|string transform idiom across every schema (the root-cause NaN bug class); emailOrEmpty + lenient isoDateString/timeString. Security: roles privilege-escalation closed; refresh-token family revocation on reuse; TOTP uses config params; read endpoints permission-guarded; received-invoices gross VAT on all paths; orders-pdf custom-items authz. Concurrency: $queryRaw SELECT...FOR UPDATE locks in ascending-id order (warehouse confirm/cancel, attendance lockUserRow); uniqueness checks moved into create transactions (TOCTOU -> 409); deterministic id tiebreak on second-precision timestamp ordering (plan resolveCell/resolveGrid, warehouse FIFO). Frontend: Rules-of-Hooks fixed across ~14 pages + PlanCellModal; UTC-date persisted fields; dashboard invalidation gaps; stale-closure confirm bugs. Tooling/tests: ESLint flat config (react-hooks/rules-of-hooks = error) + Prettier; tsconfig.test.json so tsc -b type-checks the tests; removed 3 dead deps; npm audit fix (8 -> 3). Suite 195 -> 247 (happy-path auth, FIFO oldest-first, flakiness fixes), isolated on app_test via .env.test with a hard-throw setup guard. Gates: tsc 0 | build 0 | vitest 247/247 | eslint 0 errors. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
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import fs from "fs";
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import os from "os";
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import path from "path";
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import { NasFileManager } from "../services/nas-file-manager";
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describe("NasFileManager path traversal", () => {
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@@ -53,3 +56,73 @@ describe("NasFileManager path traversal", () => {
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});
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});
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});
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/**
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* Positive-path coverage: a legitimate (non-traversal) path inside a real
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* project folder is ACCEPTED — it passes resolveProjectPath validation and
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* reaches the underlying fs op (success → null). Without this, a
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* "reject-everything" regression in the traversal guard would still pass every
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* rejection test above. Uses the constructor basePath seam + a temp dir so it
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* is deterministic even where the real NAS (Z:) is not mounted.
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*/
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describe("NasFileManager accepts legitimate paths", () => {
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let tmpBase: string;
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let nas: NasFileManager;
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const NUM = "29990001";
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beforeEach(() => {
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tmpBase = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "nas-accept-"));
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nas = new NasFileManager(tmpBase);
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// Create a real project folder <number>_<name> so findProjectFolder resolves.
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nas.createProjectFolder(NUM, "Test");
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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fs.rmSync(tmpBase, { recursive: true, force: true });
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});
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it("deletes a legitimate file inside the project folder (path accepted)", async () => {
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const folder = path.join(tmpBase, `${NUM}_Test`);
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(folder, "doc.pdf"), "hello");
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(folder, "doc.pdf"))).toBe(true);
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const result = await nas.deleteItem(NUM, "doc.pdf");
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// null = success: the path was accepted and the file actually removed.
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expect(result).toBeNull();
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(folder, "doc.pdf"))).toBe(false);
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});
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it("moves a legitimate file to a legitimate destination (both accepted)", async () => {
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const folder = path.join(tmpBase, `${NUM}_Test`);
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(folder, "from.pdf"), "data");
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const result = await nas.moveItem(NUM, "from.pdf", "to.pdf");
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expect(result).toBeNull();
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(folder, "from.pdf"))).toBe(false);
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(folder, "to.pdf"))).toBe(true);
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});
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it("a traversal delete is rejected AND deletes nothing (folder intact)", async () => {
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const folder = path.join(tmpBase, `${NUM}_Test`);
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(folder, "keep.pdf"), "keep");
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const result = await nas.deleteItem(NUM, "../keep.pdf");
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expect(result).toContain("Neplatná cesta");
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// The guard rejected the path before any fs op — nothing was removed.
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(folder, "keep.pdf"))).toBe(true);
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});
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it("rejects a traversal DESTINATION even when the source is legitimate", async () => {
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// With a real project folder, the source `from.pdf` resolves cleanly, so
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// this isolates the DESTINATION check: `../escape.pdf` must be rejected and
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// the source must stay put (no move outside the project folder).
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const folder = path.join(tmpBase, `${NUM}_Test`);
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fs.writeFileSync(path.join(folder, "from.pdf"), "data");
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const result = await nas.moveItem(NUM, "from.pdf", "../escape.pdf");
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expect(result).toContain("Neplatná cesta");
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(folder, "from.pdf"))).toBe(true);
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// Nothing escaped the project folder.
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expect(fs.existsSync(path.join(tmpBase, "escape.pdf"))).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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